“The Great Divorce” by C.S. Lewis

I just read “The Great Divorce” in one sitting last evening. I couldn’t put it down. I am amazed at how Lewis is able to capture the human condition in his writing.

Blessings,
Terry W. West

The Problem of Evil

We have all struggled with the problem of evil. How do we deal with the fact that evil exist in a universe created by a good God. I want to offer the following treatise on this subject from Augustine of Hippo. I have found this treatment of the subject to be one of the best I have read. I hope that it helps you as well. For those who would like to read the entire little handbook written by Augustine, you can do so here.
Blessings in Christ,

Terry W. West

ENCHIRIDION
ON FAITH, HOPE, AND LOVE
SAINT AUGUSTINE

CHAPTER 4
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

12. All of nature, therefore, is good, since the Creator of all nature is supremely good. But nature is not supremely and immutably good as is the Creator of it. Thus the good in created things can be diminished and augmented. For good to be diminished is evil; still, however much it is diminished, something must remain of its original nature as long as it exists at all. For no matter what kind or however insignificant a thing may be, the good which is its “nature” cannot be destroyed without the thing itself being destroyed. There is good reason, therefore, to praise an uncorrupted thing, and if it were indeed an incorruptible thing which could not be destroyed, it would doubtless be all the more worthy of praise. When, however, a thing is corrupted, its corruption is an evil because it is, by just so much, a privation of the good. Where there is no privation of the good, there is no evil. Where there is evil, there is a corresponding diminution of the good. As long, then, as a thing is being corrupted, there is good in it of which it is being deprived; and in this process, if something of its being remains that cannot be further corrupted, this will then be an incorruptible entity [natura incorruptibilis], and to this great good it will have come through the process of corruption. But even if the corruption is not arrested, it still does not cease having some good of which it cannot be further deprived. If, however, the corruption comes to be total and entire, there is no good left either, because it is no longer an entity at all. Wherefore corruption cannot consume the good without also consuming the thing itself. Every actual entity [natura] is therefore good; a greater good if it cannot be corrupted, a lesser good if it can be. Yet only the foolish and unknowing can deny that it is still good even when corrupted. Whenever a thing is consumed by corruption, not even the corruption remains, for it is nothing in itself, having no subsistent being in which to exist.

13. From this it follows that there is nothing to be called evil if there is nothing good. A good that wholly lacks an evil aspect is entirely good. Where there is some evil in a thing, its good is defective or defectible. Thus there can be no evil where there is no good. This leads us to a surprising conclusion: that, since every being, in so far as it is a being, is good, if we then say that a defective thing is bad, it would seem to mean that we are saying that what is evil is good, that only what is good is ever evil and that there is no evil apart from something good. This is because every actual entity is good [omnis natura bonum est.] Nothing evil exists in itself, but only as an evil aspect of some actual entity. Therefore, there can be nothing evil except something good. Absurd as this sounds, nevertheless the logical connections of the argument compel us to it as inevitable. At the same time, we must take warning lest we incur the prophetic judgment which reads: “Woe to those who call evil good and good evil: who call darkness light and
light darkness; who call the bitter sweet and the sweet bitter.” Moreover the Lord himself saith: “An evil man brings forth evil out of the evil treasure of his heart.” What, then, is an evil man but an evil entity [natura mala], since man is an entity? Now, if a man is something good because he is an entity, what, then, is a bad man except an evil good? When, however, we distinguish between these two concepts, we find that the bad man is not bad because he is a man, nor is he good because he is wicked. Rather, he is a good entity in so far as he is a man, evil in so far as he is wicked. Therefore, if
anyone says that simply to be a man is evil, or that to be a wicked man is good, he rightly falls under the prophetic judgment: “Woe to him who calls evil good and good evil.” For this amounts to finding fault with God’s work, because man is an entity of God’s creation. It also means that we are praising the defects in this particular man because he is a wicked person. Thus, every entity, even if it is a defective one, in so far as it is an entity, is good. In so far as it is defective, it is evil.

14. Actually, then, in these two contraries we call evil and good, the rule of the logicians fails to apply. No weather is both dark and bright at the same time; no food or drink is both sweet and sour at the same time; no body is, at the same time and place, both white and black, nor deformed and well-formed at the same time. This principle is found to apply in almost all disjunctions: two contraries cannot coexist in a single thing. Nevertheless, while no one maintains that good and evil are not contraries, they can not only coexist, but the evil cannot exist at all without the good, or in a thing that is not a good. On the other hand, the good can exist without evil. For a man or an angel could exist and yet not be wicked, whereas there cannot be wickedness except in a man or an angel. It is good to be a man, good to be an angel; but evil to be wicked. These two contraries are thus coexistent, so that if there were no good in what is evil, then the evil simply could not be, since it can have no mode in which to exist, nor any source from which corruption springs, unless it be something corruptible. Unless this something is good, it cannot be corrupted, because corruption is nothing more than the deprivation of the good. Evils, therefore, have their source in the good, and unless they are parasitic on something good, they are not anything at all. There is no other source whence an evil thing can come to be. If this is the case, then, in so far as a thing is an entity, it is unquestionably good. If it is
an incorruptible entity, it is a great good. But even if it is a corruptible entity, it still has no mode of existence except as an aspect of something that is good. Only by corrupting something good can corruption inflict injury.

15. But when we say that evil has its source in the good, do not suppose that this denies our Lord’s judgment: “A good tree cannot bear evil fruit.” This cannot be, even as the Truth himself declareth: “Men do not gather grapes from thorns,” since thorns cannot bear grapes. Nevertheless, from good soil we can see both vines and thorns spring up. Likewise, just as a bad tree does not grow good fruit, so also an evil will does not produce good deeds. From a human nature, which is good in itself, there can spring forth either a good or an evil will. There was no other place from whence evil could have arisen in the first place except from the nature — good in itself — of an angel or a man. This is what our Lord himself most clearly shows in the passage about the trees and the fruits, for he said: “Make the tree good and the fruits will be good, or make the tree bad and its fruits will be bad.” This is warning enough that bad fruit cannot grow on a good tree nor good fruit on a bad one. Yet from that same earth to which he was referring, both sorts of trees can grow.

Worth Quoting – St. Augustine

“But, as this faith, which works by love, begins to penetrate the soul, it tends, through the vital power of goodness, to change into sight, so that the holy and perfect in heart catch glimpses of that ineffable beauty whose full vision is our highest happiness. Here, then, surely, is the answer to your question about the beginning and the end of our endeavor. We begin in faith, we are perfected in sight.”

Augustine of Hippo (A.D. 354-430) Enchridion Chapter 1, Paragraph5

Worth Quoting – St. Augustine

“Things that arise in sensory experience, or that are analyzed by the intellect, may be demonstrated by reason. But in matters that pass beyond the scope of the physical senses, which we have not settled by our own understanding, and cannot – here we must believe, without hesitation, the witness of those men by whom the scriptures (rightly called divine) were composed, who were divinely aided in their senses and their mind to see and even to foresee the things about which they testify.”

Augustine of Hippo (AD 354-430) Enchridion Chapter 1, Paragraph 4

The Creator/Creature Distinction

Acts 17:28, 28 for in Him we live and move and have our being….

James 4:15, Instead you ought to say, “If the Lord wills, we shall live and do this or that.”

Here in these passages we find the fundamental relation of the creature to his Creator. In these passages every aspect of the creatures existence is presented as being predicated upon God’s immediate willing and upholding. It is clear in the context of both passages, that both Paul and James, include not just the mere physical existence, but the mental aspect of the creatures existence as well. In these passages we find that even our actions, choices, intentions, etc., are predicated upon God’s immediate willing as well.

Blessings in Christ,

Terry W. West

An Argument for Eternal Punishment from the Holiness of God

The punishment of the wicked must consist in eternal misery, because the creature, by nature, can never offer that which will fully satisfy the justice of an infinitely Holy God. The Holiness of God being the object that is offended, and the weight of guilt placed upon the creature being in direct proportion to the intrinsic value of the object that is offended, it necessarily follows that the creature can never offer that which can equal the value of the object he has offended, for the Holiness of God is of infinite value.

Blessings in Christ,

Terry W. West

The Imago Dei – The Image of God

Genesis 1:26-27, 26 Then God said, “Let Us make man in Our image, according to Our likeness; let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, over all F2 the earth and over every creeping thing that creeps on the earth.” 27 So God created man in His own image; in the image of God He created him; male and female He created them.

The doctrine of the Trinity is the single most important doctrine in Christianity. Without the doctrine of the Trinity there is no Christianity. The tri-personal relationship within the triune God of scripture provides the foundation for the ideas of love, mercy, grace, justice, and any others within the framework of personal relationships. Without the triune God as the ultimate example, these ideas become distorted or mere human conventions.

Let us take the institution of marriage as an example and contrast it with another “monotheistic” religion.

In Islam, the Koran teaches that Allah is one person, a monad, with no equal with whom to fellowship. In light of this let me ask the following questions. 1. Can such a being know love? 2. Is there someone who Allah can value supremely? 3. Is there someone who can return such affection equally to Allah to his own satisfaction? The answer to these questions is, no. Therefore, is it a surprise then, that in an Islamic worldview marriage is not seen as a union of equals founded upon a mutual love?

By contrast, the bible teaches us, in Hebrews 1:3, that the Son is the exact representation of the person of the Father, that he posesses the same nature as the Father, exampled by the Son upholding all things by the word of his power, (or in other words, the Son is all-powerful just as the Father is all-powerful). The bible also teaches us that the Son is the chief object of the Fathers love, which logically follows since the Son reflects back to the Father the same glory, the Son being the brightness of the Father’s glory. So we see that the Father and the Son fellowship as equals, with the person of the Holy Spirit proceeding forth as the expression of that love to God’s creation and in the hearts of his people. So, we find that in the Trinity we have the ultimate example of the love upon which marriage is founded, in a Christian world view, as a union of equals sharing a mutual love.

Blessings in Christ,

Terry W. West

The Insistent Use of Bad Arguments Part 3

I want to post at least one more entry under this title. In light of some discussions I have had lately on the topic of baptism, and specifically regarding the particular argument discussed in the last two articles, I want to make another observation.

I was thinking about the argument and I believe there is another fallacy going on here as well. Though it is usually unspoken, I do believe it is implied in the way that the argument is used.

First let me restate the argument that I am considering.

Premise 1. Believers are to be baptized.
Premise 2. Infants cannot believe.
Conclusion 3. Therefore Infants cannot be baptized.

Now, as has been stated several times and in several ways in the last two articles, the most glaring fallacy is that the subject of premise one and two are not the same, therefore what is true of the subject of premise one cannot be said to be untrue of the subject of premise two. The conclusion does not follow necessarily. But this is not the reason for this third entry, so I don’t want to be redundant by continuing to focus on this same critique.

Which brings me to my next critique. While discussing this argument with a baptist friend of mine, he asked me the following question. “Terry, in what way would we define baptism if not with this verse in Mark 16:16?” His point was, how are we to know to whom baptism is limited if we don’t follow the description in the verse under consideration. Well their are several ways to answer that question, but that is for another day and another article.

For now I want to point out what I believe is being implied in this kind of question and how it speaks to understanding the use of the argument made from this verse and others like it. I want to suggest that when the first premise is stated in the argument, in the mind of the person using th argument “believers” is actually “believers only”. So, the argument would then look look this:

Premise 1. Baptism is for believers only.
Premise 2. Infants are not believers.
Conclusion 3. Therefore infants cannot be baptized.

The fallacy of this argument should be easy to spot for those who understand the proper use of argumentation. This is circular reasoning. The conclusion is assumed in the first premise and therefore the argument fails because it proves nothing. It is a mere unproven assertion at this point.

Because this fallacy is unspoken and exist in the mind of the person using the argument it may be the reason why many have a hard time seeing the problem with the argument:

Premise 1. Believers are to be baptized.
Premise 2. Infants are not believers.
Conclusion 3. Therefore they are not to be baptized.

Because in their minds they are assuming the conclusion in the first premise, i.e. “Believers only” they cannot see how that the conclusion does not follow. They are convinced before they even use the argument that baptism can only be for believers, and will not allow for any other conclusion. So, because of this unspoken assumption they are “begging the question” and so they are guilty of the fallacy of circular reasoning.

Blessings in Christ,

Terry W. West

The Insistent Use of Bad Arguments Part 2

I want to tell you a story that will illustrate the difficulty getting someone to recognize a bad argument. I want to tell you about a discussion that Fred the paedo-baptist (infant baptism) had with Joe the credo-baptist (believers only baptism).

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Fred and Joe were discussing Mark 16:16.

Mark 16:16, Whoever believes and is baptized will be saved, but whoever does not believe will be condemned

Fred was attempting to show Joe that one of the major arguments used by credo’s to refute the paedo-baptist position is a bad argument because it comments a glaring fallacy. The argument is stated as thus:

1.Believers are to be baptized.
2. Infants cannot believe.
3. Therefore Infants are not to be baptized.

Now this seems like a good argument to Joe. So Fred says to Joe, “This argument is invalid because the subject of premise one and two are not the same therefore the conclusion does not follow from the premises.” So Fred attempts to illustrate this by using the same form of argument from the same scriptural text to show Joe that he would also have to conclude something about infants that he wouldn’t be willing to hold as being truth. The argument is stated thus:

1. Believers will be saved.
2. Infants cannot believe.
3. Therefore Infants will not be saved.

Now, Joe seems to be catching on at this point, and Fred is encouraged by Joe’s reply, “I see, Fred, that this is not a possible conclusion because I realize that infants can be saved, and I would not be willing to say that they are excluded from salvation because they cannot believe.”

But, as Fred and Joe continue to discuss this argument, it starts to become clear to Fred that Joe is not willing to concede that this form of argument is not valid. Joe says to Fred, “Fred, infants cannot believe therefore they do not need to be baptized. So I say we should not baptize them because they don’t need it.”

At his point Fred realizes that Joe is still insisting on using the same form of argument. So he says to Joe, “Joe, if you argue that infants don’t “need” baptism because they cannot believe, then you are committing the same fallacy, you would also have to say, based on the argument you are using from this text of scripture, that infants don’t “need” salvation either.”

Joe is horrified by this reply from Fred and does not see the inevitableness of this conclusion. So, he asked Fred, trying to catch Fred in what would be an obvious doctrinal error i.e. baptismal regeneration, “Fred, do you believe children “need” to be baptized?” Fred answers, “No, Joe, infants do not need to be baptized.” So Joe replies, “You agree with my argument, Fred.”
By this time Fred is wanting to bang his head against a wall in frustration. Fred replies to Joe, “No I don’t agree with your argument, I only agree on the fact that children don’t need to be baptized. My reasons for infants not needing to be baptized are not because I agree with you that it follows from the fact they cannot believe! My premises are not the same as yours, Joe.”

Well, Fred and Joe go around and around for a bit debating this issue. So, eventually Fred tries to show Joe how bad the argument is by replacing the words “believers” and “infants” with squirrels and dogs. The argument would be like this:

1. Squirrels have tails.
2. Dogs are not like squirrels.
3. Therefore dogs don’t have tails.

Joe looks at Fred with an expression of disbelief and says to Fred, “Well, you are just being silly now, Fred. That is not what I am saying at all!” Fred replies, ” Yes it is Joe, It is the same argument.” But Joe is unwilling to concede his argument. So, Joe and Fred decide to continue the discussion later after some thought.

_________

I think it should be obvious by now the mistake that Joe was making. He could not see that If the subject of premise one is not the same as the subject of premise two, then the negative conclusion cannot follow. What is stated as “positive” truth about the subject of premise one, cannot be concluded as “negative” truth about the subject of premise two. And the last argument presented by Fred shows this clearly.

No matter how you phase it, if the form of the argument stays the same the conclusion must be fallacious. lets look at the arguments again and replace believers with “squirrels”, infants with “dogs”, and baptism with “tails”.

Argument 1:
Premise 1. Believers should be baptized.
Premise 2. Infants cannot believe.
Conclusion 3. Therefore infants should not be baptized.

Argument 2:
Premise 1. Squirrels have tails
Premise 2. Dogs are not like squirrels.
Conclusion 3. Therefore dogs do not have tails.

Lets try it this way.

Argument 1:
Premise 1. Believers need to be baptized.
Premise 2. Infants cannot believe.
Conclusion 3. Therefore infants don’t need to be baptized.

Argument 2:
Premise 1. Squirrels need tails.
Premise 2. Dogs are not like squirrels.
Conclusion 3. Therefore dogs don’t need tails.

These are all just obvious bad arguments. Let me end this article with a good argument using squirrels that I think will illustrate the point.

Premise 1. Some squirrels are gray.
Premise 2. Some squirrels are not gray.
Conclusion 3. Therefore not all squirrels are the same color.

Blessings in Christ,

Terry W. West

The Insistent Use of Bad Arguments

One of the lessons that the Holy Spirit has taught me in the recent past is that it is hard to break the habit of using bad arguments to defend one’s position. This is true for a number of reasons. Some bad arguments are hard to recognize, they seem so “reasonable” and logical. Sometimes it is hard to be willing to recognize them as bad arguments because to do so may mean one has to change his/her position on something that is held as true, so the argument becomes a means to a supposed “good” end, i.e. the truth.

Let me illustrate this from personal experience. I was a credo-baptist until about a year ago. I have since embraced paedo-baptism. I have always been covenantal in my understanding of scripture, but I was convinced that the explicit statements in positive affirmation excluded infants from being the proper subject of baptism. My reasoning went as follows:

1. Believers are to be baptized.
2. Infants cannot believe.
3 Therefore they are excluded from baptism.

Now this seems like a sound argument, but it is actually a very fallacious one. I will let Peter Edwards explain the fallacious nature of the argument. If anyone is interested in reading the entire book you can do so here.

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ARGUMENT II.

The Scriptures require faith and repentance as requisite to baptism; but as infants cannot have these, they are not proper subjects of baptism. Infants, say the Baptists, cannot believe, cannot repent; and none should be baptized without faith, &c.

The most expeditious way of destroying this argument, would be this. They say the Scriptures require faith and repentance in order to baptism. I ask, Of whom? The answer must be, Of adults; for the Scriptures never require them of infants, in order to any thing. Then frame the argument thus: – The Scriptures require faith and repentance of adults, in order to baptism; but as infants cannot have these, they are unfit subjects of that ordinance. Now it is a glaring sophism; with adults in one proposition, and infants in the other. Were I only to leave the argument thus, and say no more upon it, it would not be possible to save it from destruction; but since it is the only remaining half of the Baptist strength, I will examine it more at large.

In order to judge of the real worth of an argument, I lay down this rule: “Every argument that will prove against an evident truth; or, which is the same thing, every argument which will support a falsehood, is clearly a bad argument.” This rule is self-evident; for that must needs be false, which tends to prove a falsehood.

I will proceed by this rule, and attempt to show, I. That this argument is entirely fallactious. II. Point out wherein its fallacy consists.

I. Of the fallacy of this argument. The principle of it is, that infants are excluded from baptism, because something is said of baptism which will not agree to infants. To see therefore the tendency of this argument, whether it will prove on the side of truth or error, I will try its operation on these four subjects.

3. On the salvation of infants. That infants may be the subjects of salvation is universally admitted; that those, who die in infancy, are actually glorified, is also granted; and yet there is something said concerning salvation, which will by no means agree to infants – “He that believeth shall be saved; he that believeth not shall be damned,” &c.

What shall we say in this case? Why, the same as before. If infants must not be baptized, because something is said of baptism, which does not agree to infants; then, by the same rule, infants must not be saved, because something is said of salvation, which does not agree to infants. And then, the same consequence again follows, that this argument, by proving against an acknowledged truth, proves itself to be fallacious.

I will lay down a plan of their logic on this text, which will produce more conclusions that there are principal words in that part of the verse. The place is Mark xvi. 16. “He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved.” Now as the Baptists reason from the order of the words, I will mark them with figures, 1believeth – 2baptized – 3saved.

The logic is as follows: Take the first and second, believeth – baptized – and say with the Baptists –

1. None are to be baptized but such as believe, because believing must be before baptizing. – “1Believeth” – “2Baptized.”

This will conclude against infant baptism.

Next take the first and third – believeth – saved – and in the same way:

2. None are to be saved, but such as believe, because believing must be before saving. – “1Believeth” – “3Saved.”

This concludes against infant salvation.

Now take the second and third – baptized – saved – and argue in the same manner:

3. None are to be saved, but such as are baptized, because baptizing must go before saving. – “2Baptized.” – “3Saved.”

This will conclude on the side of infant baptism, they must be baptized, or they cannot be saved.

Lastly, take all three – believeth – baptized – saved – and say:

4. None are to be saved but such as believe and are baptized, because believing and baptizing must be before saving – “1Believeth” – “2Baptized.” – “3Saved.”

This concludes against the salvation of believers in Jesus Christ, if they have not been baptized. And so upon the principle of the Baptists, it concludes against the salvation of all Paedobaptists.

All these conclusions, arising from the same way of reasoning, may serve as a specimen to show the fallacious mode of arguing against infant baptism, adopted by the Baptists.

Let it be tried once more:

5. On the temporal subsistence of infants, As the reader may perceive the drift of the reasoning, on these instances, I will use but few words on the present one. Now that infants should be supported, not only Scripture, but nature itself teaches. And yet, if we form the Baptist argument, on a few places of Scripture, it may be proved, in opposition to Nature and Scripture both, that infants should actually be left to starve.

We have nothing to do but mention the texts, and apply their reasoning to them. Isaiah i. 19. “If ye be willing and obedient, ye shall eat the good of the land.” 2 Thess. iii. 10. “If any would not work, neither should he eat.” Take the first, and say with the Baptist in another case: Willingness and obedience are required of those who are to eat of the good of the land; but since infants can neither will nor obey, they must not eat the good of the land. In the same way let the other be taken: He that will not work, neither shall he eat; infants cannot will to work, then infants must not eat.

This argument, in whatever way it is viewed, proves against the truth. Is it a truth, that infants should subsist? This argument proves against it. Is it a truth, that infants should be saved? This argument will prove to the contrary. Was Christ rightly baptized? According to this argument it could not be. Were infants proper subjects of circumcision? This argument will prove they were not. Then, if it invariably support a falsehood, we are compelled to say it is a false argument.

II. I will point out wherein this fallacy consists. As this argument, notwithstanding it is false, is used by the Baptists in general, both learned and unlearned, I will attempt to lay open its fallacy; and thereby put those persons upon their guard, who may be in danger of being seduced by it. The judicious reader may have observed, that I slightly hinted at the outset, wherein its fault consisted; but to make it yet more evident what that fault is, of which it is guilty, I will take the liberty of saying a few words more.

That particular rule, against which this argument offends, is this:

“Non debet plus esse in conclusione quam erat in praemissis. Ratio manifesta est, quia conclusion educenda est ex praemissis.”

That is, “There should not be more in the conclusion than was in the premises. The reason is plain, because the conclusion is to be drawn from the preminses.” We will try to make this plain, by examples of both of true and false reasoning.

1. In the Baptist way of reasoning. When the Scriptures say, “Repent and be baptized;” and, “If thou believest thou mayest,” &c. they address only sinful adults; and then, an argument formed upon them should reach no further than adults of the same description. But the Baptists form their fallacious argument on these passages, by bringing infants into the conclusion, who as they are not addressed, are not at all concerned in the premises. This will appear plain by three instances on the Baptist plan.

The Baptist argument runs thus: The Scriptures require faith and repentance in order to baptism; but infants have not faith and repentance: therefore they are not to be baptized. Now as the Scriptures require faith and repentance only of adults, we must place that word in the argument, and then it will stand in this form: The Scriptures require faith and repentance of adults in order to baptism; but infants cannot have these: therefore infants are not fit subjects of baptism. In the same way, we may form the two following instances, viz. The Scriptures require faith and repentance of adults in order to salvation; but infants cannot have these: therefore infants cannot be saved. Again, He [an adult] who will not work, neither should he eat; but an infant cannot will to work, therefore an infant should not eat. The reader may perceive, that by placing the word adults in one proposition, and infants in the other, (which makes it a sophism,) there are three things proved in the same way, viz. That infants cannot be saved—that infants should not eat—that infants should not be baptized. And so, for the same reason, that an infant cannot be saved, that an infant should not eat, it will follow, that an infant should not be baptized. For all these are equally true, and supported by the same reasoning. (Peter Edwards, Candid Reason For Renouncing The Principles of Anti-Paedobaptism, Chapter 2, Argument 2)

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When I read this as a credo-baptist I was amazed at how easily the central argument of my position was shown to be fallacious, but I still did not want to give the argument up, because I knew to do so would mean the defeating of my dearly held “truth”. The lesson that I learn, by the grace of God, is that if something is indeed true, then I should be able to arrive at the truth through good reasoning. If my “truth” can only be supported by a bad argument, then what I am holding as truth must be discarded.

I have found this to be true of myself in other areas as well. So, in light of this knowledge of my own tendency, I have to be careful in the way I approach scripture, I must pray that the Holy Spirit shows to me my tendency toward dishonesty and that he grant me the grace of coming to the sacred word of God with an honest heart to be taught the truth and to in turn defend it with good and honest arguments.

Blessings in Christ,

Terry W. West